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CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-SEARCH AND SEIZURE-FEDERAL CAUSE OF Ac-
TION FOR AN ILLEGAL SEARCH AND SEIZURE-The Supreme Court of the
United States has held that there is a federal cause of action founded
directly on the fourth amendment against federal agents who have
conducted an illegal search and seizure.
Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Nar-
cotics, 403 U.S. 388 (1971).
Petitioner sought recovery for humiliation and mental suffering re-
sulting from a search and seizure of his apartment conducted by federal
agents without probable cause. The District Court for the Eastern
District of New York dismissed the case for lack of federal jurisdiction
and failure to state a cause of action.' The Second Circuit Court of
Appeals held that jurisdiction existed, but affirmed the lower court's
dismissal for failure to state a cause of action.2 The United States
Supreme Court granted certiorari3 to consider whether an illegal search
and seizure conducted by federal officials gives rise to a federal cause
of action for damages.
In rejecting the argument that fourth amendment rights are properly
protected by state remedies, 4 the Court reasoned that state remedies in
the form of civil trespass laws protect interests which are not necessarily
identical with those protected by the constitutional amendment. The
fourth amendment is not limited or defined by local trespass law; in-
deed, the interests protected may be inconsistent. The Court further
found that damages have historically been awarded whenever personal
rights have been violated. Where a statute provides jurisdiction, the
damage remedy is normally available to the federal courts whether the
injury arises under a statute or under the constitution. 5 The Court con-
cluded that petitioner was entitled to recover money damages for
1. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 276 F. Supp.
12 (E.D. N.Y. 1967).
2. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 409 F.2d
718 (2d Cir. 1969).
3. 399 U.S. 905 (1970).
4. The Constitution does not specifically provide a means of enforcing the amendments
and the burden has often fallen to the states. See generally Comment, State Remedies for
Federally Created Rights, 47 MINN. L. REv. 815, 816 (1963).
5. Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S.
388, 396 (1971), citing Bell v. Hood, 327 U.S. 678, 684 (1946), where the Court stated that
"it is well settled that where legal rights have been involved, and a federal statute provides
for a general right to sue for such invasion, federal courts may use any available remedy
to make good the wrong done."
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injuries resulting from a federal agent's violation of the fourth amend-
ment.6
As early as 1900 the Court allowed an action for damages against
state election officials who had refused the plaintiff a vote in a congres-
sional election.7 While this action was based on the Constitution,"
never before the instant case had the Court found a federal cause of
action for damages directly on the language of an amendment.9
In some earlier cases, the Court indicated that the remedy granted
was constitutionally founded, but these cases were based either indi-
rectly or directly on federal or state statutes. In one decision the Court
went so far as to conclude that the statute under which the action was
brought was not necessary for enforcement of the right-the right
rested directly on the fifth amendment. 10
While not explicitly creating a cause of action based directly on the
Constitution, the Court has exhibited a broad range of discretion in the
use of its equitable power. In some instances, the Court has applied rem-
edies to implement statutory schemes where Congress specified a wrong
but neglected to prescribe a remedy." For example, 42 U.S.C. § 1983,12
previously section 1 of the Civil Rights Act of 1871,13 provides liability
for persons acting under color of state law who deprive others of con-
stitutional rights but does not specify the procedure for redress or the
kind of damages. Under this statute, the courts have upheld illegal
search and seizure claims against state officials by construing the claims
6. The Court did not entertain the question of whether the agents were immune from
liability due to their official position as it had not been reached by the court below.
7. Wiley v. Sinkler, 179 U.S. 58 (1900).
8. The Court stated that the right had "foundation in the Constitution and the laws
of the United States." Id. at 62. Accord, Nixon v. Condon, 286 U.S. 73 (1932); Nixon v.
Herndon, 273 U.S. 536 (1927); Giles v. Harris, 189 U.S. 475 (1903); Swafford v. Templeton,
185 U.S. 487 (1902).
9. The Court possibly came closest in West v. Cabell, 153 U.S. 78 (1894), but this case
can be distinguished on the basis that the federal official involved posted a bond for his
performance.
10. Jacobs v. United States, 290 U.S. 13 (1933).
11. See, e.g., J. I. Case Co. v. Borak, 377 U.S. 426 (1964). A stockholder was allowed a
civil cause of action based upon an alleged violation of the Securities Exchange Act of
1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j(b) (1964), although the language of the statute made no mention of
a private cause of action. The opinion stated that "it is the duty of the courts to be alert
to provide such remedies as are necessary to make effective the congressional purpose." 377
U.S. at 433.
12. 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) provides:
Every person who, under color of any statute, ordinance, regulation, customs or
usage, of any State or Territory, subjects, or causes to be subjected, any citizen of the
United States or other person within the jurisdiction thereof to the deprivation of
any rights, privileges, or immunities secured by the Constitution and laws, shall be
liable to the party injured in an action at law, suit in equity, or other proper pro-
ceeding for redress.
13. Act of April 20, 1871 ch. 22, § I, Rev. Stat. § 1979, 17 Stat. 13.
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to be a deprivation of right under the fourth amendment, applicable
to the states through the fourteenth amendment. 14 The anomalous re-
sult of these decisions, prior to the instant case, had been a remedy for
federal constitutional violations against state officials, but not against
federal officials.
In areas where there are no guiding statutes, the Court has exercised
its equitable power to provide non-damage remedies for official mis-
conduct. Ejectment has been used as a remedy for violation of the con-
stitutional ban against a taking of property without compensation.'5
Injunctive relief has been granted in instances as diverse as cases in-
volving police violations of the Constitution 6 to cases in the recently
developing area of school desegregation.' 7 In an exercise of its super-
visory power, the Court has excluded from the courtroom evidence
obtained in violation of the Constitution.
8
In view of the wide scope of discretion exhibited by the Court's use
of its equitable power,19 the creation of a remedy where a federal con-
stitutional right is involved should not seem surprising.20 The Court
,has previously been inclined to mold law where there is a grant of
jurisdiction and an absence of statutory guidance. 21 Furthermore, a
violation of the right to be free from unreasonable search and seizure
by federal officials is an injury deserving of remedy. Indeed, the original
14. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167 (1961); Cohen v. Norris, 300 F.2d 24 (9th Cir. 1962).
See generally Shapo, Constitutional Tort: Monroe v. Pape and the Frontiers Beyond, 60
Nw. U.L. REV. 277 (1965). For an interesting application of the statute, see Lankford v.
Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966), where a federal court issued an injunction under
authority of 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964) to halt repeated searches of Negro homes by the Balti-
more police.
15. United States v. Lee, 106 U.S. 196 (1882).
16. Ricket Rice Mills v. Fontenot, 297 U.S. 110 (1956) (federal injunction used to pre-
vent federal officers from collecting an unconstitutional tax); Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 496
(1939) (federal injunction issued as a remedy to enjoin police from illegal arrest and
detention of individuals); Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908) (an attorney general pre-
vented from proceeding under an unconstitutional statute).
17. See, e.g., Reynolds v. Sims, 377 U.S. 533 (1964); Griffin v. County School Board of
Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964). For a discussion of the federal injunction
as a remedy, see Comment, The Federal Injunction as a Remedy for Unconstitutional
Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
18. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
19. Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803). The Court stated that "the
very essence of civil liberty certainly consists in the right of every individual to claim the
protection of the laws, whenever he receives an injury." Id. at 163.
20. Textile Workers v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957). The Court stated that "it
is not uncommon for federal courts to fashion federal law where federal rights are con-
cerned." Id. at 457.
21. Clearfield Trust Co. v. United States, 318 U.S. 363 (1943). "In the absence of an
applicable Act of Congress it is for the federal courts to fashion the governing rule of law
according to their own standards." Id. at 367. This principal, applied in Clearfield in a
contract action, was later applied in a tort action in United States v. Standard Oil Co. of
California, 332 U.S. 301 (1947).
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conception of the fourth amendment was at least partly inspired by
English cases granting civil damages for illegal searches by government
officials. 22
Although the Court did not view it as a necessary criterion for cre-
ation of the remedy,23 whether the new cause of action will be more
effective in preventing official misconduct than previously existing
remedies is a question that arises. The remedies that existed prior to
the new cause of action were judicial exclusion, 24 state criminal ac-
tions, 25 federal criminal actions26 and state civil trespass actions. There
is much agreement that the exclusionary rule has proved ineffective in
discouraging police violations of the fourth amendment; 27 moreover, it
does not compensate the innocent victim of an unreasonable search. 28
The lack of prosecutions under federal and state criminal statutes attest
to their ineffectiveness,29 which has been attributed to the reluctance
of prosecutors to indict their subordinates.30
22. See, e.g., Entick v. Carrington, 95 Eng. Rep. 807 (1765). For a brief history behind
the creation of the fourth amendment, see Boyd v. United States, 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
23. 403 U.S. at 388.
24. See cases cited in note 18, supra.
25. State statutory provisions are listed in Edwards, Criminal Liability for Unreason-
able Searches and Seizures, 41 VA. L. Rav. 621 (1955). See also Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,
652 (1960); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 30-31 (1949).
26. Federal statutes have provided criminal liability for federal officers or employees
who conduct a search without a search warrant and without probable cause since 1921.
18 U.S.C. § 2236 (1964).
27. See Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403
U.S. 388, 426-27 (1971) (Appendix to Chief Justice Burger's dissenting opinion). Justice
Burger in his dissenting opinion viewed the Court's decision to create a new cause of
action as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine and beyond the judicial power
of the Court. 403 U.S. at 412-13. He described the exclusionary rule as being an "anoma-
lous and ineffective mechanism." Id. at 420. Finally, he suggested that Congress should
develop an administrative remedy whereby the exclusionary rule would be abrogated in
its entirety, a cause of action for violation of the fourth amendment would be created,
sovereign immunity of federal officials would be waived and a quasi-judicial tribunal
would adjudicate all claims. Id. at 422-23. See Comment, The Federal Injunction as a
Remedy for Unconstitutional Police Conduct, 78 YALE L.J. 143 (1968).
28. Besides its general inhibiting effect on unreasonable police searches, the magnitude
of which has been questioned (supra note 27), the rule benefits only those who are found
to possess illegal drugs or evidence of crime that could possibly be suppressed prior to
trial as fruits of an illegal search. See Camara v. Municipal Court of the City and County
of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523, 530 (1967). This is not true in the confession or identifica-
tion areas where the rule tends to protect indiscriminately both the guilty and non-guilty.
A major difference between the areas is that coerced confessions or tainted identifications
are inherently unreliable as evidence while fruits of a search are reliable whether or not the
search was legal.
29. Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643, 651-53 (1960). In Nusslein v. District of Columbia,
115 F.2d 690, 695 (1940), the court commented on the existence of the federal criminal
statutes but noted there had never been, to that date, a prosecution under it. In Baxter v.
United States, 188 F.2d 119 (6th Cir. 1951), the court recognized that the officers had
violated the act but no prosecution was undertaken. See generally Edwards, supra note 25.
Only a few state cases have involved criminal prosecutions for illegal searches. Id. at 622.
30. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128, 152 (1954) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wolf v.
Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 42 (1949) (Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Finally, state civil trespass actions have proved useless. This failure
has been attributed to two reasons. First, the doctrine of sovereign
immunity protects the governmental body for which the offending
officer was acting. Second, damage awards are primarily limited to
property damage that is often minimal in an illegal search.
The rule has long existed that a government agent is personally liable
only where his actions transgress the limits of authority afforded him
by his position.31 Otherwise, he is included within the sovereign im-
munity of the state.3 2 This concept has been applied to make agents
liable who acted pursuant to an unauthorized order of a superior3 3 or
pursuant to the command of an unconstitutional statute.3 4 Any illegal
search might be viewed as being beyond the authority of an agent,
thereby placing him outside the protection of sovereign immunity.
The difficulty with this formulation is that where the act of an agent
requires the exercise of his judgment, courts usually construe his au-
thority as broadly as possible.35 An agent of the government has been
held personally immune even where his conduct could subject the
government to liability.3
6
In considering the deterrence value of civil suits, the rule that sover-
eign immunity protects the agency for which the offending official acts
has far reaching significance. Only actions occurring within the nebu-
lous area referred to as probable cause are deemed to be within the
authority of a law enforcement official conducting a search.3 7 A jury, in
determining whether probable cause exists, might be unduly influenced
by sympathy for the plight of an official facing liability; whereas in
determining the liability of a government agency, the jury may arrive
at a more objective decision. Furthermore, a judgment against a govern-
ment agent may be uncollectable as an individual agent is apt to be
judgment proof.38 A judgment against the government agency, on the
31. Little v. Barreme, 6 U.S. (2 Cranch) 169 (1804). See, e.g., Goldman v. American
Dealers Service, 135 F.2d 398 (2d Cir. 1943). Officials who seized a citizen's property without
lawful authority were stripped of their official character and treated as private wrongdoers.
32. In Pennsylvania, for example, the rule is that lawful authority acts as a complete
defense. McAleer v. Good, 216 Pa. 473 (1907).
33. Bates v. Clark, 95 U.S. 204 (1877); Mitchell v. Harmony, 54 U.S. (13 How.) 115,
137 (1851).
34. Chaffin v. Taylor, 114 U.S. 309 (1884).
35. See, e.g., Spalding v. Vilas, 161 U.S. 483 (1896). An agent was held immune from
personal liability even though his actions were maliciously performed. The Court held
that his conduct involved matters within the authorized scope of his discretion.
36. Larson v. Domestic and Foreign Commerce Corp., 337 U.S. 682, 703 n.27 (1949).
37. See, e.g., Kozlowski v. Ferrara, 117 F. Supp. 650, 652 (S.D.N.Y. 1954). F.B.I. agents
are permitted to exercise judgment in the analogous area of arrest only within the scope
of probable cause.
38. See, e.g., Lankford v. Gelston, 364 F.2d 197 (4th Cir. 1966). The court reasoned
714
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other hand, would serve as incentive for correcting abuses, and could
filter down to him in the form of discipline or in the form of general
policies adopted by his superiors.39
Even if a judgment is allowed against a government entity for an
unlawful search conducted by one of its agents, an additional problem
is encountered in that the amount of damages recoverable is not usually
significant. As damage awards are usually limited to property damage, 40
a serious invasion of the fourth amendment could result in minimal
recovery.
As the new cause of action is similar to state civil actions, it is likely
that it will suffer from the same defects. 41 Without punitive or exem-
plary damages, judgments will have negligible deterrent effect on official
misconduct. Even substantial recoveries will be meaningless where an
official is judgment proof. In addition, as the judgment will be against
the officer alone, and not against the governmental agency for which he
acts, it will have no effect on the general policy of the agency.
It is submitted that a solution to the persistent problem of official mis-
conduct might be in a congressional scheme waiving sovereign immunity
and providing punitive damages. This scheme would not only remove
the barriers of immunity, as was done in the Tort Claims Act,42 but
should, as a matter of course, implicate the agency directly superior to
the offending official. 43 Such a provision would result in direct pressure
that the assets of police afford little chance of compensation for illegal searches. Id. at
202. See generally Hall, The Law of Arrest in Relation to Contemporary Social Problems,
3 U. Cm. L. REv. 345, 346 (1936).
39. See generally Comment, Suits Against Governments and Officers: Damage Actions,
72 HARV. L. REV. 209, 229 (1963); Hall, supra note 38, at 347-48.
40. See Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 41-44 (1948) (Murphy, J., dissenting), where the
illusory nature of the trespass action due to the lack of meaningful damages is discussed.
Many states are inclined to limit punitive damages; a few permit none at all. In
Pennsylvania, for example, plaintiff must show malice in fact before he can recover
punitive or exemplary damages. McCarthy v. De Armit, 99 Pa. 63 (1881). A case which is
unique because it granted damages for pain and suffering resulting from an unlawful
search is Deaderick v. Smith, 33 Tenn. App. 151, 230 S.W.2d 406 (1950).
41. There are indications that actions against state officials under 42 U.S.C. § 1983
(supra notes 12-14 and accompanying text) have also been plagued by these same defects.
Monroe was decided within a year after Mapp and yet it is not clear that 42 U.S.C. §
1983 has been any more effective than the exclusionary rule in discouraging unlawful
police conduct. Only a few cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 have allowed exemplary
damages. See, e.g., Basista v. Weir, 340 F.2d 74, 86 (3d Cir. 1965) (punitive damages
awarded); Rhoads v. Horvat, 270 F. Supp. 307, 310 (D. Colo. 1967) (damages for pain,
suffering and humiliation allowed). The question of whether government entities can be
sued under the Act has been a confused issue with varying results in different jurisdic-
tions. See Comment, Suing Public Entities Under the Federal Civil Rights Act: Monroe
v. Pape Reconsidered, 43 U. CoLo. L. REv. 105, 106-10 (1971).
42. Federal Tort Claims Act, Act of Aug. 2, 1946, Ch. 753, 60 Stat. 842 (codified in
scattered sections of 28 U.S.C.).
43. The Federal Tort Claims Act removed the immunity of the government to suits
715
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on the agency to correct the abuses of its subordinates. The scheme
could allow a suit to be brought nominally against the official, while
providing a remedy against the government entity. In analogous situa-
tions statutes have provided for suits against specific government offi-
cials while allowing relief against the United States. For example, a
suit may be brought against the Alien Property Custodian for return
of the proceeds from property erroneously seized and sold,44 and against
the Federal Housing Commissioner for claims arising under his agency's
activities. 45
Punitive damages would be an essential element of the scheme. 46 The
use of punitive damages may be seen in the provisions of other stitutes.
The treble damage provision of the anti-trust laws provides incentive
for its enforcement and deterrence for its violation.4 7 In order to create
incentive for private actions against individuals defrauding the govern-
ment, the "qui tam" statutory provision allows a minimum recovery
of $2000 for each violation successfully prosecuted.48 Similarly, punitive
damages would provide incentive to enforce the mandate of the fourth
amendment.
Richard Douglas Carleton
for injuries caused by its agents, but this waiver of immunity did not extend to harms
caused through discretionary action of government officials. 28 U.S.C. § 2680(a) (1964).
44. 50 U.S.C. App. § 9(a) (1964). See, e.g., Guessefeldt v. McGrath, 342 U.S. 308 (1952).
45. 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (1964).
46. It is submitted that Justice Burger's proposed administrative scheme (supra, note
27), designed primarily as a replacement for the exclusionary rule, would also prove
ineffective unless it provided punitive damages.
47. 15 U.S.C. § 15 (1964).
48. 31 U.S.C. § 231 (1964). Where there is an attempt to defraud the government, as
outlined in 31 U.S.C. § 231, any person can bring a "qui tam" action to recover damages
on behalf of the government and receive half of the damages. A minimum recovery of
$2000 for each violation serves as an incentive for bringing the suit. See, e.g., United States
ex rel. Marcus v. Hess, 317 U.S. 537 (1943).
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